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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Learning Strategies and Natural Languages 
A language is called natural just in case it can be acquired by normal 
human infants in the casual fashion of first language learning.1 Since not 
every language is natural, it makes sense to seek a nontrivial property that 
distinguishes the natural from the nonnatural. One interesting suggestion is 
that children master a language by selecting a grammar for it from an 
innately determined class of candidates; the natural languages are those for 
which a grammar is included among these candidates, nonnatural languages 
enjoy no such candidate. An adequate theory of natural language, on this 
view, would characterize the natural anguages by characterizing the class of 
grammars innately available to the child. 
This equation of the natural languages with those for which a grammar is 
innately available requires a nontrivial assumption, amely, that children can 
determine which grammar of those available fits the incoming linguistic data. 
For, to master a language it is not sufficient o be able to devise a grarrlmar 
for it; it is also necessary to recognize the adequacy of such a grammar, and 
the inadequacy of competing grammars. Indeed, even a creature of quite 
limited intelligence can generate all possible grammars (in the form of 
Turing machines) by employing simple enumeration techniques; selecting an 
appropriate grammar in response to samples from an arbitrary r.e. set is 
quite another matter. Should the assumption prove false--should children be 
+ The second author was partially supported by NSF Grants MCS 80-02937 and 82-00032. 
~That is, considering only languages of expressive power oughly comparable to, say, 
English. One word languages are learnable but not natural on grounds of inexpressiveness. We 
leave the expressiveness proviso tacit. 
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unable to deploy their available grammars to maximum effect-- then the 
natural languages may be only a proper subset of the languages determined 
by the innate stock of grammars. 
It is the learning strategy to which the child conforms that determines the 
subset of innate grammars that can be successfully paired with incoming 
languages. As an example of a learning strategy, suppose that children are 
not able to store past data, and therefore revise conjectured grammars only 
on the basis of recent inputs; the result may be that children cannot learn 
every language for which they can generate hypotheses (cf., Section 3.3). 
Again, suppose that children never abandon a grammar that is consistent 
with all the data received so far; it is possible that the learnable class of 
languages is restricted thereby (cf., Section 3.5). It is evident hat a given 
learning strategy is restrictive only in the context of a given set of candidate 
grammars. Consider two creatures, one equipped with a given learning 
strategy S and an innate stock G of grammars, the other equipped with S 
and an extension G' of G. The first creature might be able to acquire every 
language projected by G whereas the second might be restricted to a proper 
subset of the languages projected by G. 
The "optimality" of such learning strategies i  not at issue; the strategies 
might represent compromises in the language faculty that arise from more 
global design features of the nervous system. Note, too, that the child's 
strategies may so restrict the possible natural languages that acquisition, 
being narrowly channeled, can be speedy and efficient. 
Little information is currently available about the learning strategies 
employed by children in the course of language acquisition. More fundamen- 
tally, there is no taxonomy of learning strategies that reveals which strategies 
are restrictive relative to given sets of candidate grammars. To aid in 
developing such a taxonomy the present paper characterizes several kinds of 
learning strategies, and considers their restrictiveness in very general terms. 
For this purpose it will be necessary to give precise formulations of some of 
the notions figuring informally in this introductory discussion; Section 2 is 
devoted to such matters. Section 3 offers a parade of different kinds of 
learning strategies, taken singly and in combination with each other. Before 
turning to the formal definitions of Section 2, it will be useful to place our 
study in the context of related work on language learnability. 
1.2 Learning Strategies and Models of Language Acquisition 
Let us call a language child-learnable if it can be acquired by normal 
human infants on the basis of the usual sort of linguistic input provided to 
the young. A condition of adequacy on theories of natural anguage is that 
they specify a child-learnable collection of languages. By a model of 
language acquisition is meant a specification of (a) the kind of linquistic 
input available to human infants in the course of normal language 
34 OSHERSON~ STOB, AND WEINSTEIN 
acquisition, (b) the internal calculations performed on this input by the child, 
and (c) a criterion of successful anguage acquisition. 2 Plainly, the more 
explicit and faithful our model of language acquisition, the more useful the 
associated condition of child-learnability. 
Seminal papers by Gold (1967) and by Wexler and his associates (see 
Wexler and Culicover, 1980, and citations therein)have provided a plausible 
and explicit model of language acquisition. The associated child-learnability 
condition has already figured in the evaluation of contemporary theories of 
natural language (see Wexler and Culicover, 1980; Pinker, 1979). The basic 
model embodies several critical assumptions corresponding to (a)-(c). 
Regarding (a), essential linguistic input is thought to be restricted to 
sentences of the target language; ill-formed strings, so designated, are 
thought o be rarely and inessentially available to the child. 3 All (but only) 
the sentences of the target language are potentially available to the learner; 
these sentences are conceived as an infinite list, each sentence occupying one 
or more positions some finite distance from the start of the list. 4 Regarding 
(b), the learner is construed as examining, piecemeal, ever longer initial 
segments of the input list of sentences; from time to time she conjectures a
grammar for the language on the list. The function that maps initial segments 
of a list into the learner's conjectures is assumed to be computable. 
Regarding (c), should there come a moment after which the learner always 
conjectures the same grammar, and that grammar is a correct grammar for 
the language listed, then she is said to have "converged" on the given list to 
the language listed. If, no matter which way a given language is listed, the 
learner will ultimately converge on the list to that language, then we count 
the learner as being able to acquire that language. 5 It is thus assumed that 
the order in which sentences are presented to the child may affect the speed 
of acquisition but not its ultimate success. The assumptions associated with 
(a)-(c) are discussed by Wexler and Culicover (1980, Chaps. 1 and 2). 
Section 3 of the present inquiry focusses on part (b) of the language 
acquisition model. We investigate potential strategies that may govern 
children's successive conjectures about the input language. For purposes of 
Section 3, parts (a) and (c) of the model are assumed to be adequate. 
2 See Wexler and Hamburger (1973) for a general discussion of such models of language 
acquisition. 
3 In the work of Wexler and Culicover (1980), not sentences but fragments of scntential 
derivations are assumed tobe available to the learner. But the crucial assumption is preserved, 
namely, that negative information about grammaticality s not presented xplicitly. 
4 For discussion of alternative construals of"environment" forlearning see Osherson, Stob, 
and Weinstein (1983b). 
For an extensive discussion of alternative criteria of success in language acquisition see 
Osherson and Weinstein (1982a). 
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2. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, basic definitions, construals, and notation are set forth. 
2.1 Exact Identifiability 
Languages are here construed extensionally, simply as sets of sentences. 
Sentences may be taken to be ordered collections of phrase markers, or as 
phrase markers paired with a representation of meaning. So long as each 
sentence is a finite object, and the collection of all possible sentences can be 
coded by Goedel numbers, the exact nature of sentences is not relevant; 
indeed, for maximum generality, we shall construe languages imply as 
subsets of the set N of natural numbers. In the same spirit, grammars will be 
taken to be Turing machine indices; so, grammars are also natural numbers, 
appropriately interpreted. A Turing machine index is said to be for a 
language if the Turing machine with that index accepts that language. A 
language for which there is such an index is called recursively enumerable. 6 
By an elementary result of automata theory, there are an infinity of distinct 
(but equivalent) indices for each recursively enumerable language. 
Henceforth, we restrict attention to recursively enumerable languages. 
A total function, t :N~N,  is called a text. A text onto a language L is 
called a text for L. A function cr from some finite ordinal into N is called a 
(finite) sequence. SEQ denotes the set of all finite sequences. A sequence 
that constitutes an initial segment (in the obvious sense) of a text t is said to 
be in t. The length of a sequence cr is denoted by lh(cr). 
A learning function q) is any partial function from SEQ into N. Henceforth 
we consider only computable learning functions, and we often speak of the 
learning machine M in place of the learning function computed by M. Given 
a learning machine M a text t and an index n we say that M converges to n 
on t just in case (a) M is defined on every sequence in t, and (b) there exists 
an m such that for all sequences ~ in t, if m < lh(a), then M(o) = n. We say 
that M converges on t just in case there is an n such that M converges to n 
on t and we say that M eonverges to L on t just in case there is an n such 
that M converges to n on t and n is a Turing machine index for L. M is said 
to identify L just in case M converges to L on every text for L. 
Let L be a class of languages. M is said to identify L just in case M 
identifies every language in L. M is said to exactly identify L just in case M 
identifies L, and M identifies no proper superset of L. We let L(M) denote 
the class of languages exactly identified by M. A class L of languages i said 
to be identifiable just in case there is a Turing machine M such that 
L _~ L(M); L is exactly identifiable just in case L = L(M) for some M. 
We make several observations about these developments. 
6 For notions of recursion theory introduced here and elsewhere see Rogers (1967). 
36 OSHERSON, STOB, AND WEINSTEIN 
(1) To grasp the definition of exact identifiability it helps to bear the 
following intuitive Picture in mind. The learner is to be conceived as 
implementing some learning function f A text for a language L is fed into 
the learner, one cell at a time (each cell holds one member of L). With each 
new cell, the learner is faced with a new finite sequence of numbers. I f f  is 
defined on a given sequence, the corresponding value is put out by the 
learner; otherwise, the learner is "blocked," and no more text is put in. The 
learner converges to L on the input text just in case (a) blocking never 
occurs on that text, and (b) after some finite number of cells, the learner 
always puts out the same index for L. 
(2) There are several ways that # machine M can fail to converge to a 
language L on a text t for L: (i) M could fail to be defined on some sequence 
in t; (ii) M might yield an infinite number of distinct indices; (iii) M might 
perpetually alternate among a finite set of distinct indices; or (iv) for some n, 
M might yield the same index m for all sequences in t with length greater 
than n, but m not be an index for L. 
(3) Each text for a language L represents a possible order in which 
the sentences of L might arise in the experience of the (idealized) learner. 
Only the sentences of L appear in these potential inguistic environments; 
information about nonsentences i not directly provided. (See Wexler and 
Culicover, 1980, Sect. 2.7 for discussion.) 
2.2 Strategies and Restrictions 
A (learning) strategy is a subset of learning machines. A learning strategy 
(i.e., subset of machines) S is called a restriction on exact identifiability just 
in case there is an exactly identifiable class L of languages uch that for all 
MCS,  L ~ L(M). 
Strategies can be partially ordered as follows: With each strategy S is 
associated a family, 
F s = {L: for some machine, M G S, L(M) = L}. 
We say that strategy S is more restrictive for exact identifiability than 
strategy S'  just in case F s % Fs,. 
Substitution of "identifiability" for "exact identifiability" in the above 
yields definitions of a restriction on identifiabilicy and more restrictive for 
identifiability than. 
When the context permits, we often speak simply of "restrictions," without 
qualification. 
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2.3 Notation 
We abide by the following conventions. The Turing machine with index i 
is denoted M i. Mi(xo) 1 signifies that M i is defined on x 0. W i is the language 
accepted by Mi; K= {i: Mi(i).~ }. 
A collection of languages L is r.e. indexable if and only if there is an r.e. 
set X such that L = { W i : i ~ X}. 
mi,s(Xo) denotes the value, if any, delivered by M~ on input x 0 after s steps 
of computation; if the context prevents confusion, we also use Ms(xo) for the 
value, if any, delivered by Turing machine M on input x 0 after s steps. 
Given a text t {(n) denotes the finite sequence {(0, t(0)) ..... (n, t(n))} of 
length n + 1. Similarly, given a sequence o of length m, for n < m, 6(n) 
denotes the sequence {(0, o(0)),..., (n, o(n))} of length n + 1. o -  denotes the 
sequence resulting from omitting the last element of a. 
For simplicity, we often denote a sequence ~(0, t(0)),(1, t(1)),...} by 
(t(0),t(1),...); similarly for finite sequences. A is used to concatenate 
sequences in the usual way. p~ is the jth prime number. 
3. STRATEGIES, RESTRICTIVE AND NONRESTRICTIVE 
/'\ 
Strategies are restraints on how a learner may respond to a sample of a 
language L. To see how a learner might be restrained, consider the 
"freedom" available to an arbitrary learning machine M. If M learns L, M 
must eventually, on each presentation of L, produce a single index for L. But 
there is no restriction on which index for L may be used; nor is M required 
to begin its convergence at any particular time. Again, M's incorrect 
conjectures need not have any particular elation to the data that prompts 
them, nor to earlier conjectures. Finally, if M does not learn L, then no 
particular behavior of M is required on any presentation of L; M need not 
even make a single conjecture. 
In this section we consider the effects of limiting a learner's freedom in 
various ways. Six kinds of constraints are examined. These pertain to (1)the 
response of a machine M to languages it can not identify, (2) assumptions M 
makes about the character of languages it will encounter (3) the manner in 
which M employs past information in responding to current input, (4) the 
speed with which M generates conjectures, (5) the conditions under which M 
abandons old conjectures, and (6) the conditions under which M adopts new 
conjectures. One or more specific strategies are discussed under each rubric. 
We ask whether the strategy is restrictive, or whether it acts to further 
restrict some other strategy. The psychological reality of various strategies i
also considered. 
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3.1 Responding to Languages That Are Not Identified 
Under our definition of learning, if M identifies L, then M(o) is defined 
whenever range(a)_L .  But suppose M does not identify L. Various 
behaviors on texts for L are possible. M may, for instance, not be defined on 
some a such that range(6)c_ L. For example, M may "realize" that 6(0) is 
not an element of any language that M can learn. At the other extreme, M 
may converge on some text for L, or even converge on every text for L, 
albeit not always to grammars for L. The present subsection examines four 
means of constraining the relationship of M to languages it can not identify. 
The corresponding strategies are called "totality," reliability," confidence," 
and "prudence." 
Totality. We first consider machines that respond to every input. 
DEFINITION. A machine M is called total just in case M computes a total 
function, i.e., M(6)~ for every 6. 
PROPOSITION 3.1A. For every machine M there is a total machine M '  
such that L(M) c_ L(M'). 
Proof. If 6 is a sequence, define 6 s to be the longest initial segment of 6 
such that Ms(as)~ if there is such. Define 
M'(6)  = Mih(og(61h(o_)), if 61h(o ) exists, 
= O, otherwise. 
Evidently, M '  is total and L (M)c  L(M'). 
Informally, M '  does not wait forever for M(6) to be defined, but settles for 
the guess M(e') ,  for some initial segment 6' _c ~. But for longer strings 6, M '  
waits longer for M to be defined. II 
Thus, totality is not a restriction on the classes of languages that can be 
identified. It is, however, a restriction on the classes of languages that can be 
exactly identified. 
PROPOSITION 3. lB. There is a class of  languages L such that L = L(M) 
for some machine M but L ~ L (M ' )  for  any total machine M' .  
Proof. The class L consists of those languages L i = {i} such that if t i is 
the text given by ti(n ) = i for all n, then Mi(fi(n)) is defined for all n, but M i 
does not identify L; on t t. 
First we show that no total machine M'  can exactly identify L. Suppose 
that M i is total and exactly identifies L. If L i C L, then M i does not identify 
L i. Thus L iE  L. However, Mi([i( j)  ) is defined for every j;  thus, since 
L i ~z L, M i must  identify L i on t i . But this contradicts L i q~ L. 
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We now construct an M such that L = L(M). Obviously we need only 
describe how M behaves on the texts t i. M(fi(n))= an index for L i if 
M({i(n)) is defined. M({i(n)) is defined if and only if there is an m > n such 
that Mi([i(m)) is defined and Mi(ii(m))~Mi({i(n)) or  WMi(ii(m)),m=/= {i}. 
Thus, M converges to L; on t; if and only if M i is total and M i changes its 
conjecture infinitely often or converges to a wrong conjecture. I 
We suspect that totality is a feature of the human language learner. It 
seems unlikely that there is a possible speech input that would send the 
infant into an endless computation, depriving her forever of language; even- 
tually, she must terminate her deliberations, if only to default to some empty 
or otherwise primitive grammar. 
Reliability. If  M occasionally converges to an incorrect language, then M 
may be termed "unreliable." 
DEFINITION (Minicozzi, cited in Blum and Blum, 1975, Sect. 5). A 
machine M is reliable just in case for all languages L and texts t: N-*  L, if 
M converges on t, then M converges to L. 
To show that reliability is restrictive, we rely upon a useful lemma due to 
Blum and Blum (1975, Sect. 4). 7 
LEMMA 3.1C. Suppose that M identifies L. Then there is a finite 
sequence a such that range(a)~ L and for every r _~ e, tf range( r )c  L, then 
M(r) is an index for L, and M(r) = M(a). 
PROPOSITION 3.1D. Suppose that M is reliable. Then if L 6 L(M), L is 
finite. 
Proof. Suppose that L 6 L(M), but L is infinite. By Lemma 3.1C, let e 
be such that range(a)c_ L, and if r ~ a, and range( r )c  L, then M(T) is an 
index for L and M(r )=M(e) .  This implies that for some text, 
t :N -~ range(a), M converges to L on t. But range(a) is finite and L is 
infinite, so M does not converge to range(a) on t. Hence, M is not 
reliable. II 
Assuming (as we do) that natural languages are infinite, Proposition 3.1D 
shows that reliability is not a feature of human learners. 
Confidence. Whereas the reliable machines converge on a text only if 
they converge to the language for which it is a text, the confident machines 
converge on every text. 
7 For an extended iscussion of this lemma and its connection with topological 
considerations in learning theory see Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein (1983a). 
40 OSHERSON~ STOB~ AND WEINSTEIN 
DEFINITION. A machine M is confident just in case M converges on t, for 
every text, t. 
PROPOSITION 3.1E. There & a collection of languages L such that L is 
exactly identifiable by a total, reliable machine M but L is not identifiable by 
any confident machine M'. 
Proof Let L be the set of finite languages and define M(o) to be an 
index for range(o). Then M is a total, reliable machine with L(M) = L. 
Suppose for reductio that M'  is a confident machine with L ~_ L(M'), and 
let t be a text for some infinite language. Let o n be o concatenated with itself 
n times. Define a sequence of finite sequences as follows: Let o 0 = (t(0)). Let 
oi+ 1=o t -o  ~, where o is the shortest initial segment of t such that 
range(or -o )# WM~¢~) and n is the least m such that WM,¢,i^,m)= 
range(o/ 0). Let t = U {o~: i E N}. Then t' is a text on which M'  does not 
converge, which contradicts the hypothesis that M '  is confident. I 
Prudence. A final restriction on how a machine may respond to 
languages it cannot identify is a constraint on what the machine may 
respond if it chooses to respond at all. 
DEFINITION. A machine M is prudent just in case M(o)~ implies that M 
identifies WM~). 
Before stating our results about prudent machines it will be necessary to 
introduce the notion of an order-independent machine and a lemma 
concerning the existence of such machines. 
DEFINITION (Blum and Blum, 1975, Sect. 4). A machine M is called 
order-i~dependent just in case for every L E L(M) there is an index j for L 
such that for every text t: N-~L for L there is an n such that M(f(n + i)) = j  
for every i. 
LEMMA 3.1F (Blum and Blum, 1975). For every machine M there is an 
order-independent machine M' such that L(M)~ L(M'). 
Proof While our notion of identification is different from that of Blum 
and Blum (1975), the proof they give works here with minor 
modifications, l 
PROPOSITION 3.1G. L is exactly identifiable by a prudent, order- 
independent machine M if and only if L is identifiable and r.e. indexable. 
Proof One direction is straightforward, since a prudent machine iden- 
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titles all and only languages for which it conjectures an index and the set of 
indices conjectured by any machine is r.e. 
In the other direction, suppose that L is identifiable by some machine M'  
and X is an r.e. set of indices for L. By Lemma 3.1F we may, without loss of 
generality, suppose that M '  is order-independent. Let f be a total recursive 
function which enumerates X. We construct an order-independent, prudent 
machine M such that L(M)= L as follows: 
If lh (a)= 1, let M(a)= f(O). If lh(a)> 1, then M simulates M'  on input 
a. If M'  diverges on a, then M does also. If M' (a)  = y, then M uniformly 
constructs recursive enumerations go ..... glh~o) of Wy(o ~ ..... Wy~lh(o)) and 
searches for the least i such that M'(~i(lh(a)) ) = y. If such an i is found, let 
M(a) =f( i ) ;  if not, M(a) = M(a-) .  
Since M'  is order-independent and identifies L, M is also order- 
independent and identifies L. But, range(M) _~ X, hence M exactly identifies 
L and is prudent. II 
COROLLARY 3.1H. There is a collection L of languages uch that L is 
exactly identifiable, but L is not exactly identifiable by any prudent machine. 
Proof By Proposition 3.1G it suffices to show that there is a collection 
of languages L'  such that L '  is exactly identifiable but L'  is not r.e. 
indexable. The collection L',  of singleton languages 
{il, for i~ /~ 
is such a collection. L'  is exactly identifiable by a machine that conjectures 
an index for {i} on initial input i, then begins an internal enumeration of K; 
if i shows up in the enumeration, the machine begins an infinite alternation 
of indices for O and N. And L'  is not an r.e. collection, since that would 
exhibit/(  as r.e. II 
It is an open question whether or not every identifiable collection of 
languages can be identified by a prudent machine. By Proposition 3.1G this 
is equivalent to the question whether every identifiable collection of 
languages can be extended to an identifiable collection of languages which is 
r.e. indexable. 
Children acquiring language may well be prudent learners, especially if 
"prestorage" models of language acquisition are correct. A prestorage model 
posits an internal ist of candidate grammars that coincides exactly with the 
natural languages; language acquisition amounts to the selection of a 
grammar from this list in response to linguistic input. Such a prestorage 
learner is prudent inasmuch as his hypotheses are limited to grammars from 
the list, that is, to grammars corresponding to natural (i.e., learnable) 
languages. 
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3.2 Assumptions about Languages to be encountered 
Next we consider machines which are constrained by assumptions they 
make about the character of languages they will encounter. The sole 
constraint we consider is the assumption that the languages to be encoun- 
tered are infinite. 
DEFINITION. M is nontrivial if and only if Vx (x E range(M)-~ W x is 
infinite). 
Nontriviality is clearly a restrictive strategy, since no nontrivial machine 
identifies a finite language. More interesting, however, is the fact that 
nontriviality even restricts the collections of infinite languages that are 
available to the learner. 
PROPOSITION 3.2A. There is an identifiable collection of infinite 
languages which is not identifiable by a nontrivial machine. 
Proof. Let L i =/p~'+~: n ~ Wi} and let L = {Li: W i is infinite}. Let g be 
a total recursive function such that L i = Wg(i ) and let 
m(a) = g(pi(3n(a(lh(a)- 1)= p~+ l))) if there is such an i, and an index for 
O otherwise. Then M exactly identifies {Li: i C N} and hence identifies L. 8 
It remains to show that L is not identifiable by a nontrivial machine. 
Suppose, for reductio, that M is a nontrivial machine which identifies L, and 
let X = range(M). Then X is an r.e. set such that for every n C X, W n is 
infinite, and L ~ { Wn : n C X}. But, there is a total recursive function h such 
that Wh~) is infinite if W~ is infinite, and if W n = L i E L, then When) = W i. 
But then h[X] is an index set for INF (=/L :  L is infinite}) and this 
contradicts the fact that INF is not r.e. indexable (which can be shown via a 
simple diagonalization). II 
Linguists rightly emphasize the infinite quality of natural languages; no 
natural language, it appears, includes a longest sentence. If this universal 
feature of natural anguage corresponds to an innate constraint on children's 
linguistic hypotheses, then they would be barred from conjecturing a 
grammar for a finite language. To this extent child language learners may 
implement a nontrivial earning strategy. 
3.3 Using Past Information 
In this subsection, two constraints are examined that pertain to the effect 
of past information or a learner's current conjecture. The corresponding 
strategies are called "set-drivenness" and "memory-limitation." 
s The reader should note that M is a 1-memory limited machine in the sense of Section 3.3. 
In addition, it can be shown that L is exactly identifiable using methods which are developed 
in Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein (forthcoming). 
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Set-drivenness. Suppose that M(o) depends only upon the elements 
appearing in range(a), not upon their order. Then we have the "set-driven" 
machines. 
DEFINITION (Wexler and Culicover, 1980, Sect. 2.2). A machine M is 
set-driven if range(a) = range(r) implies M(a) = M(r). 
PROPOSITION 3.3A (Blum and Blum, 1975). For any machine M there is 
a set-driven machine M' such that L(M) ~ L(M'). 
Proof The machine constructed in the Blums' proof of Lemma 3.1F is 
set-driven. II 
Whereas the last Proposition shows that set-drivenness i  not restrictive 
for identification, we have been able to show that it is restrictive for exact 
identification. 
PROPOSITION 3.3B. There is a machine M such that for no set-driven 
machine M' is L(M) = L(M'). 
Proof Let L= {{n}: W,:/= {n}}. L can be exactly identified by a 
machine M as follows: 
M(a)=an index for {n / if and only if a ( i )=n for all i, and 
Wn,lh~)4: {n}. Otherwise, M(a) is chosen to be an index for 
{lh(~)}. 
To see that no set-driven machine M'  will exactly identify L, let M'  be 
such a machine. Define a recursive function g so that 
Wg(n) = 0, if M'((n)) does not exist, 
= W~t,~<n> ) , otherwise. 
Function g is a total recursive function, so there is an n o such that 
Wg~o) = Wno. Suppose that W,0 = {no}. Then {no} ¢ L. On the other hand, 
M'  converges to g(no) on any text consisting entirely of n0's since M'  is set- 
driven and Wg(,o)= WM,(<,o>) (since Wg(,o) is nonempty). Thus, M'  identifies 
{no}. Now suppose that W,04: {no}. Then M'  must identify {no} but 
Wg(,o) = W,o :/= {no} so that M'  does not identify /no} since either m'((no) 
is not defined or WM,~<,0>~ 4: {no}. II 
It seems obvious that human infants are not set-driven. 
Memory-limitation. Another sort of restriction we might impose on how 
machines use past information is a memory restriction. The following 
definition might be viewed as a formalization of short-term memory. 
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DEFINITION (Wexler and Culicover, 1980, Sect. 3.2). A machine M is n- 
memory-limited if whenever a and r are finite sequences that agree on their 
last n arguments (i.e., (Vi ~< n) a(lh(a) - i)--- r(lh(Q - i)), then M(a - )  := 
M(r -  ) implies M(a) ---- M(r). 
PROPOSITION 3.3C. There is a class of languages L such that L = L(M) 
for some machine M but for no n is there an n-memory-limited machine M' 
such that L ~ L(M') .  
Proof Let L consist of the language L = {2i: i C N}, along with, for each 
j C N, the languages 
and 
L j= {2i: iCN} U {3 j} 
Lj  = {2 i : iC  N and i4~j}U {3J}. 
It is easy to see that L = L(M) for some machine M. But suppose that 
L_  L (M' )  for some 1-memory-limited machine M '  (the case for n > 1 is 
similar). Intuitively, if M '  sees 3 j for some j, M '  cannot remember if it has 
seen 2 j a while ago, and so cannot distinguish between Lj and Lj. Then by 
Lemma 3.1C, there is some sequence a such that range(a)c  L and whenever 
r _~ a, range(T)c_ L, then M'(a)= M'(r) .  Let a '=  a"  (3 j°) for some fixed Jo 
such that 2 j0 ~ range(a). Let n + 1 = lh(a), and let a" = a ^ (2 j°) " (3Jo). 
Now a '  and a" agree on their last arguments. Also M'(a ' - )=M' (a" - ) .  
Thus M'(a') = M'(a"). But then considering the texts t 1 = 
a '  ^  (2 °, 21, 2 2 ..... 2i,...)i¢Jo and t2 = a" ^ (2 a, 21, 2 2 ..... 2i,...)i¢Jo , we have 
that M '  converges on t 1 and t 2 to the same index because of memory 
limitations. But tl is a text for Ljo, and t 2 is a text for Ljo. II 
Memory limitations will be seen to increase the restrictiveness of several 
other strategies. There are alternative ways to formalize the intuitive idea of 
a limited memory, but it is clear that children operate under some such 
constraint. 
3.4 Speed of Conjectures 
We now examine the impact of bounding the time available to a learner to 
respond to an input. The sole strategy considered is called "fast-working." 
Fast-working. 
DEFINITION. Let h be a recursive function. M is an h-fast-worker just in 
case M(a)+ if and only if Ms(a)~ for some s ~< h(a). 
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Fast-working places a further restriction on what memory-limited 
machines can identify. 
PRO~'OSITION 3.4A. For every n, and for every recursive function h there 
is a class L of languages uch that L = L (M) for  some n-memory-limited 
machine M, but L4zL(M' ) fo r  any h-fast-working, n-memory-limited 
machine, M'. 
Proof We prove the proposition for the case of n = 1; the other cases 
are similar. Let R be a recursive set whose characteristic function cannot be 
computed in 2x.  h(o ^ x)-time for any o; i.e., for every total recursive 
function ~0 such that (p(x) = 1 if and only if x ~ R and for every o, there are 
infinitely many x such that ~oh~-~x,(x ) is not defined. Let L = {R •F :  F is 
finite}. Clearly, L is identifiable. But no machine M'  of the sort asked for 
can exist. For, choose a finite string o such that range(o) ___ R, and for every 
v, r ~ cr and range(r) ~ R implies M'(v) = M'(~). Then to see whether n ~ R, 
A 
compute M'(~r (n)). n ~ R if and only if M'(cr (n)) = M'(o) by memory- 
limitedness of R. But this constitutes an effective procedure for answering 
n ~ R in time h(cr ^ (n)). II 
3.5 Abandoning Conjectures 
We next consider constraints on the freedom of a learner to abandon 
hypotheses. The sole strategy considered allows machines to give up a 
conjecture only if it fails to predict what has been seen so far on the input 
text. 
Conservatism. 
DEFINITION. A machine M is conservative just in case whenever cr c v 
and M(cr) 4: M(r), then WM~ol 75 range(r). 
The conservative machines were introduced by Angluin (1980); however, 
Angluin's definition of identification is quite different from ours. Note that a 
conservative machine will not abandon any conjecture W i if the text is for a 
language L _ Wi. Thus, one might suppose the strategy to be a restriction. 
Indeed, 
PROPOSITION 3.5A. There is a class of languages L such that L = L(M) 
for some learner M, but L ~ L(M') for any conservative l arner M'. 
Proof The proof is similar to one given by A~gluin (1980), although she 
worked with a different and weaker notion of learner. 
L consists of languages Lj and L j ,  for all j E N, where Lj = { p i~: i E N} 
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and Lj = {pj}, unless there are integers s and n such that for the machine 
with index j, 
Mj(fj(n)) = i, where fj(k) = p~ W,,, ~ {p), p] ..... p]} ( . )  
If such an s and n exist, choose the least such s and least n for that s, and let 
Lj = {p 1,..., p]}. It is easy to see that L = L(M) for some machine, M. But 
suppose that L_  L(Mj) for some j such that Mj. is conservative. Then there 
must be an n and s satisfying ( , )  since Mj identifies Lj andf j  is a text for Lj. 
' ~ ..... p ]  }. On the text, t, defined But then for the least such s and n, Lj = {pj  
by 
t (m)= p7 +l, if m<n,  
= p],  otherwise, 
we must have that Mj(f(m)) = i for all m >/n if Mj is conservative. Thus Mj. 
does not learn Lj on text t. 
Informally, if Mj learns Lj it must eventually conjecture a language larger 
than the finite language it has seen so far. But then, if Mj. is conservative, it 
cannot cut its conjecture back to this finite language. | 
In turn, set-drivenness restricts exact identifiability for the conservative 
machines. 
LEMMA 3.5B. I f  a class of languages L can be exactly identified by a 
set-driven, conservative machine, then L is r.e. indexable. 
Proof Let M be conservative and set-driven. Consider W= {i: (3a) 
(M(a) = i and range(a) c Wi) }. Obviously, W is r.e. We claim that i C W if 
and only if 3L C L(L = Wi). Certainly, if L C L, L = W i for some iC  W. 
Suppose i C W. Let a be such that M(a) = i and range(a) c_ W i. If t is a text 
for W i beginning with a, then M identifies W i since M is conservative. But if 
t '  is any text for Wi, then range(t')_~range(a) so that for some n, 
range(i'(n))~range(a). But then M(i ' (n) )=M(v) ,  where range(Q= 
range(f'(n)) and v begins with a. For such a v, however, M( r )= M(a) since 
M is conservative. | 
LEMMA 3.5C. There is a class of languages L which can be exactly iden- 
tiffed by a conservative machine M which is not r.e. indexable. 
Proof The class of languages L consists of languages L i = {2i}, i C N 
and L[ = {2 i, 3 i} for i C ~T, where A is some fixed nonrecursive r.e. set. The 
conservative machine M works as follows. If M sees 3 i before 2 i it 
conjectures L[.  If M sees 2 i before 3 i it conjectures L i and begins an internal 
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simulation of A. If M then sees 3 i it conjectures L i unless its internal 
simulation of A has enumerated i C A. If so, then M conjectures an index for 
N. M exactly identifies L, for if i E A there will be some text t for L~, where 
3 i first appears in t after i appears in A. However, L is not r.e. indexable lse 
X is r.e. II 
PROPOSITION 3.5D. There & a class of languages L such that L = L(M) 
for a conservative machine M, but L 4: L (M ' ) fo r  any conservative, set- 
driven machine M'. 
Proof By the lemmas. II 
3.6 Adopting New Conjectures 
Conservatism imposes conditions on which conjectures may be aban- 
doned. In the present section we consider five conditions on which 
conjectures may be adopted. 
Consistency. We first consider machines which require their new 
conjectures to explain all the data the machine has seen so far. 
DEFINITION. (a) A machine M is cons&tent just in case whenever M(a)~, 
then W~)  _~ range(a). (b) A machine M is weakly consistent just in case 
whenever M(a-) 4= M(a), then WM~) ----- range(a). 
The notion of consistency is due to Angluin (1980). 
When combined with totality, consistency is a severe restriction on what 
can be identified. 
PROPOSITION 3.6A. Suppose that L C L(M), where M & a consistent, 
total machine. Then L is reeursive. 
Proof Let a be such that range(a)_  L, and if r___ a, then range(r)~ L 
implies M(r) = M(a). Such a a exists by Lamina 3.1C. Then, to test whether 
n~L,  compute M(a^(n)).  If nCL ,  M(a^(n))=M(a) .  If n~L ,  then 
M(a ^  (n))~ since M is total, and M(o ^  (n))4= M(o) since M is consistent. 
This gives an effective test for membership in L. II 
In light of children's limited memory, consistency would seem to be a 
psychologically unrealistic strategy. 
Caution. Conservative machines do not overgeneralize on languages they 
do in fact identify (since once a conservative machine overgeneralizes, it is 
trapped in that conjecture); however, a conservative machine may well 
overgeneralize on a language it does not identify. We now examine machines 
that behave as if they never overgeneralize. 
643/53/1-2~ 
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DEFINITION. A machine M is cautious just in case whenever 
M(a) 4: M(r) and a c r, then WM(~) is not a proper subset of WM(,). 
Like conservatism, caution is a restriction in a very strong sense. 
PROPOSITION 3.6B. There is a class of languages L such that L = L(M) 
for some machine M, but L ¢z L(M') for any cautious machine M'. 
Proof. The proof of Proposition 3.5A establishes this proposition as well: 
we simply observe that Mj of that proof can be neither conservative nor 
cautious if it identifies the class L of languages described therein, l 
Conservative machines are not necessarily cautious. However, their lack 
of caution does not allow them to identify any more. 
PROPOSITION 3.6C. Suppose that M is a conservative machine. Then 
there is a cautious, conservative machine M' such that L(M) _ L(M'). 
Proof For every sequence a let d be the longest initial segment of a such 
that Ms(d ) is defined and WMta),s ~ range(d) for some s ~< lh(a) if such a 
sequence xists, and (a(0)) otherwise. Define M ' (a )= M(d). 
First notice that if L E L(M), then L E L(M'), for if t: N~ L is a text for 
L, then there is an n such that M(g(n))= i for some index i for L, and 
(Vm >/n) (M(f(m)) is an index for L). Then, for large enough m, [(m) D [(n), 
and thus M'(f(m)) is an index for L. M '  is cautious ince if a _c r, then d _c f, 
so that M ' (a )=M(d)  and M'(r)=M(f) .  If M'(a)4:M'(O, then 
M(d) ~ M(f) so that WMta ) ~b range(f). But WM(~) ~ range(f). Thus, 
WM,(T )4: WM,t~ ). It is easy to see that M '  is conservative. 1 
Decisiveness. A decisive machine never returns to a language once aban- 
doned. 
DEFINITION. A machine M is decisive if whenever a_  r and 
WM(o. ) ~ WM(.r) , then there is no y such that r _~ 7 and WM(o)= WM(~, ) . 
Like the cautious machines, the decisive machines can identify everything 
identifiable by the conservative machines. We have not, however, been able 
to determine whether deciveness i restrictive. 
PROPOSITION 3.6D. I f  L = L(M) for some conservative machine M, then 
L ~_ L(M') for  some decisive machine M'. 
Proof. The machine M'  in the proof of Proposition 3.6C is decisive, l 
Gradualism. We next study machines that employ a built-in "simplicity 
metric" in a certain way. 
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DEFINITION. A machine M is gradualist just in case there is a one-one 
recursive function, f :  N~ N, and an integer n, such that if M(o-)4= M(a), 
then [ f (M(o) ) - f (M(o - ) )  I <~ n; we call the least such n the modulus of M. 
Intuitively, a gradualist machine has a measure f, of complexity of 
grammars, and it changes conjectures only to grammars of nearby 
complexity. Gradual ism is not restrictive if the machine is not memory 
limited; otherwise, gradualism imposes a constraint over and above memory 
limitation on what can be identified. 
PROPOSITION 3.6E. I f  M is any machine, then there is a gradualist 
machine M' such that L(M) = L(M') .  
Proof (Informal). M '  simulates M. If M wants M '  to change a 
conjecture m to conjecture k, M '  does this by using the next I f (m) - f (k ) l  
inputs to effect this change one level of the f hierarchy at a time. Memory is 
used to store these latter inputs, which are subsequently fed to M in the 
continuation of the simulation. | 
PROPOSITION 3.6F. There is a class of languages L such that L = L(M) 
for some memory-limited machine M, but L ~ L (M' ) fo r  any gradualist, 
memory-limited machine M'. 
Proof. Let L = { { 1, m }: m ~ N}. Obviously, a 1-memory-limited machine 
M exists which exactly identifies L. Suppose M'  is gradualist. Consider the 
texts 
tn(i )= 1, if i4: 1, 
= n, if i=  1. 
Then M'  on t n must converge to an index for { 1, n / if M '  identifies L. Since 
M'(tn(O)) = M'(tm(O)) for all n and m, and since M '  is gradualist, there are 
infinitely many pairs of integers n and m such that n :~ m and M' ( /n (1 ) )= 
M'(im(1)). But then, since M '  is memory-limited, M '  converges on infinitely 
many of the t n to the same index. Thus M '  cannot identify L. (In fact, if M '  
is k-memory-l imited and j is the modulus of M' ,  then M'  converges correctly 
on at most (2j) k+~ of the texts tn. ) | 
Induction by enumeration. One strategy for generating conjectures is to 
choose the first grammar in some effective list of grammars that is consistent 
with the data seen so far. 
DEFINITION. A machine, M, uses induction by enumeration just in case 
there is a recursive function, f,  such that M(o)=f ( i ) ,  where i is the least 
number such that range(o)~ Witi). 
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Here {M:(t):iCN } is the effective list of grammars. Notice that the 
condition on M(a) given by the definition cannot be taken as a definition of 
M; for, a function meeting that condition need not be recursive. However, if 
{ W:(i) : i E N} is in fact a uniformly recursive sequence of recursive sets, then 
a function meeting the condition above is recursive, and, indeed, M is defined 
thereby. Even in these special circumstances, however, induction by 
enumeration is restrictive. 
PROPOSITION 3.6G. There is a uniformly recursive class L of languages 
such that L --- L(M) for some machine M, but L cannot be identified by any 
machine M' that uses induction by enumeration. 
Proof. Let L ,  = {x: x >/n}, and let L = {L, : n E N}. Obviously M exists. 
If M' exists, let f be the supposed ordering function. Certainly there are 
natural numbers i < j such that Ws(i) ~ Wsu ). But then M presented with a 
text for W:u ) converges to W:(i). I 
4. CONCLUSION 
For a class of languages to be the natural languages, the class must be 
learnable by children. Formal learning theory is an attempt o deploy this 
fundamental fact in the evaluation of theories of natural anguage. For such 
a purpose, the notion "learnable by children" must be rendered precisely. 
The concept of "exact identifiability" defined in Section 2.1 is a step toward 
the needed formalization. However, children do not implement arbitrary 
learning functions, but rather a special kind whose characteristics derive 
from human developmental psychology. To the extent hat we impose those 
characteristics on the learning functions under consideration, exact iden- 
tifiability becomes a more stringent and useful condition on theories of 
natural language. As an aid to discovering such characteristics, Section 3 
presented a variety of learning strategies; both the restrictiveness and the 
psychological reality of these strategies were discussed. 
Totality, nontriviality, and memory-limitedness were among the more 
realistic of the learning strategies developed in Section 3. It was seen that 
totality is by itself restrictive, and that the combination of all three strategies 
is more restrictive than any taken singly. These considerations suggest he 
following condition of adequacy on theories of natural anguage. 
A theory of natural language is adequate only if the class of 
languages it specifies as natural is exactly identifiable by a total, 
nontrivial,  n-memory-limited learning- machine (for some 
reasonable choice of n). (c) 
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Ref inement of (C) will l ikely involve further considerat ion of strategies. 
However, the criterion of learning as well as the construal  of env i ronment  
offered by the Gold model must also be subjected to scrutiny on both 
empirical  and formal grounds. These latter topics are addressed in Osherson 
and Weinstein (1982), and Osherson et al. (in preparation).  
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